Cult.DAO consists of two main groups: Guardians and voters. DAO members pledge CULT tokens to receive the corresponding dCULT. dCULT corresponds to voters' right to govern. The first 50 CULT pledgers will become Guardians and have the right to propose. All other CULT pledgers are voters.
The total number of CULTs is 6,666,666,666,666 CULTs. On January 30, 2022, 50% of the tokens are put up for pre-sale in unicrypt, raising 250 ETH, and each wallet can only buy 1 ETH worth of CULTs. 50% of the CULTs that are not pre-sold, most of which go into uniswap's liquidity. Some of them are gifted to prominent people as Guardian's share. The last 10% goes to the development team working without compensation (linear vesting within 12 months).
The content of all Guardian proposals needs to be related to investments in other decentralized protocols. The proposal includes the total supply of tokens for the invested protocol, and the CULT.DAO's share investment will receive the audit report of the protocol, the burn and distribution plan, and the token economics. Revenue from the DAO pool of funds used for investment comes from 0.4% of CULT token transactions. For every 15.5 ETH worth of CULT raised, 2.5 ETH worth of CULT will be destroyed and 13 ETH worth of CULT will be credited to the invested protocol. CULT.DAO encourages proposals to fight centralization and drive further decentralization to the ground.
The founder of CULT.DAO, Mr. O'Modulus, is currently anonymous. Still, his KYC certification with Solidproof shows him a well-known cryptocurrency founder. Although Mr. O'Modulus started the project, the ownership of Token attribution, smart contracts, and Uniswap Liquidity LP will all be destroyed. The founder will not be able to interfere with the running of the DAO and the investment/revenue of the DAO will be run through a smart contract, the ownership of which has been destroyed.
In the concept of DAO, all organizational communities have to face the problem of efficiency and fairness of the organization in the operation process. A core team or centralized power facilitates the organization's operation. Still, it is not decentralized enough, while too much-decentralized power leads to a reduction inefficiency.
CULT.DAO separates the right to propose from the right to vote, ensuring that guardians do not propose projects for personal gain while having sufficient privileges to vote as pledged. The guardian setting drives the progress of CULT.DAO proposals and contributes to efficiency, while the voting rights dispersed to pledgers ensure fairness. This is an ideal mechanism for the operation of a DAO, with a better balance between fairness and efficiency.
CULT.DAO separates the right to propose from the right to vote, ensuring that guardians do not propose projects for personal gain while having sufficient privileges to vote as pledged. The guardian setting drives the progress of CULT.DAO proposals and contributes to efficiency, while the voting rights dispersed to pledgers ensure fairness. This is an ideal mechanism for the operation of a DAO, with a better balance between fairness and efficiency.
However, CULT.DAO has many drawbacks, based on its 13 ETH investment value, which is not a very large scale for the project. Therefore, to a certain extent, the project itself will not give too much benefit for this investment to fight for the possibility of more proposals. In addition, the smart contract is set to be non-upgradable and a proxy contract. This also makes the project potentially risky to upgrade and replace.